In an attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme, a ciphertext is associated with an -bit public index ind and a message m, and a secret key is associated with a Boolean predicate P. The secret key allows decrypting the ciphertext and learning m if and only if P(ind) = 1. Moreover, the scheme should be secure against collusions of users, namely, given secret keys for polynomially many predicates, an adversary learns nothing about the message if none of the secret keys can individually decrypt the ciphertext.
Attribute-based encryption captures as a special case previous cryptographic notions such as identity-based encryption (IBE) [Shamir 1984; Boneh and Franklin 2001; Cocks 2001 ] and fuzzy IBE [Sahai and Waters 2005] . It has also found applications in scenarios that demand complex policies to control access to encrypted data (such as medical or multimedia data [Akinyele et al. 2011; Li et al. 2013; Papanis et al. 2014] ), as well as in designing cryptographic protocols for verifiably outsourcing computations [Parno et al. 2012 ] (see Section 2.3 for further discussion).
The crucial component in the security requirement for attribute-based encryption stipulates that it resists collusion attacks, namely, any group of users collectively learns nothing about the message m if none of them is individually authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
In the past few years, there has been significant progress in attribute-based encryption in terms of efficiency, security guarantees, and diversifying security assumptions [Goyal et al. 2006; Waters 2009; Cash et al. 2012; Agrawal et al. 2010a; . On the other hand, little progress has been made in terms of supporting larger classes of predicates. The state of the art is Boolean formulas [Goyal et al. 2006; , which is a subclass of log-space computations. Constructing a secure attribute-based encryption for all polynomial-time predicates was posed as a central challenge by Boneh et al. [2011] . We resolve this problem affirmatively in this work.
OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
We construct attribute-based encryption schemes for circuits of every a-priori bounded depth, based on the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. In the course of our construction, we present a new framework for constructing attribute-based encryption schemes, based on a primitive that we call "two-to-one recoding" (TOR). Our methodology departs significantly from the current line of work on attribute-based encryption [Goyal et al. 2006; and instead builds upon the connection to garbled circuits developed in the context of bounded collusions [Stehlé and Steinfeld 2010; Gorbunov et al. 2012] . Along the way, we make the first substantial progress towards the 25-year-old open problem of constructing reusable garbled circuits. In particular, we obtain the first construction of reusable garbled circuits that satisfies authenticity but not privacy. In a follow-up work, Goldwasser et al. [2013] completely resolve this open problem by constructing reusable garbled circuits with authenticity and privacy; moreover, their construction relies crucially on our ABE scheme as an intermediate building block. More details follow.
Attribute-Based Encryption
For every class of predicate circuits with depth bounded by a polynomial function d = d(λ) (where λ is the security parameter), we construct an ABE scheme that supports this class of circuits under the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. Informally, the (decisional) LWE problem [Regev 2009 ] asks to distinguish between "noisy" random linear combinations of n numbers s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Z n q from uniformly random numbers over Z q . Regev [2009] showed that solving the LWE problem on the average is as hard as (quantumly) solving several notoriously difficult lattice problems in the worst case. Since then, the LWE assumption has become a central fixture in cryptography. We now have a large body of work building cryptographic schemes under the LWE assumption, culminating in the construction of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme [Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011] .
The key parameter that determines the hardness of LWE is the ratio between the modulus q and the maximum absolute value of the noise B; as such, we refer to q/B as the hardness factor of LWE. The problem becomes easier as this ratio grows but is believed to be hard for 2 n -time algorithms when q/B = 2 O(n ) , where 0 < < 1/2. Our results will hold as long as the latter holds for some constant . Similar LWE parameters were used in the context of leakage resilient cryptography and fully-homomorphic encryption [Akavia et al. 2009; Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011] .
In particular, our main result constructing selectively secure attribute-based encryption (where the adversary must commit to the challenge public attribute vector ind before seeing the public parameters) can be summarized as follows.
THEOREM 2.1 (INFORMAL) . Assume that there is a constant 0 < < 1 for which the LWE problem is hard for aexp(n ) factor in dimension n, for all large enough n. Then, for any polynomial d, there is a selectively secure attribute encryption scheme for general circuits of depth d.
Moreover, our scheme has succinct ciphertexts in the sense that the ciphertext size depends polynomially on the depth d and the length of the attribute vector ind but not on the size of the circuits in the class. The construction as stated achieves the weaker notion of selective security, but we can easily obtain a fully secure scheme following Boneh and Boyen [2004] (but using subexponential hardness in a crucial way). COROLLARY 2.2. Assume that there is a constant 0 < < 1/2 such that the LWE problem with a factor of exp(n ) is hard in dimension n for exp(n )-time algorithms. Then, for any polynomial d, there is a fully secure attribute-based encryption scheme for general circuits of depth d.
We also obtain a new ABE scheme for branching programs (which correspond to the complexity class LOGSPACE) under the weaker quasi-polynomial hardness of LWE. THEOREM 2.3 (INFORMAL). There exist attribute-based encryption schemes for the class of branching programs under either (1) the hardness of the LWE problem with an n ω(1) factor, or (2) the bilinear decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.
Here, there is no a-prori bound on the size or the depth of the branching program. In addition, we achieve succinct ciphertexts of size O( ), where is the number of bits in the index. Prior to this work, under the same n ω(1) -hardness assumption of LWE that we use, the state-of-the-art constructions were limited to IBE and inner product encryption [Cash et al. 2012; Agrawal et al. 2010a Agrawal et al. , 2011 (i.e., special cases of branching programs). However, under the same bilinear maps assumption, Goyal et al. [2006] achieved a similar result to ours using secret sharing for general access structures. Our bilinear construction is a different way to achieve the same result but exploits a combinatorial property of branching programs. The construction is inspired by a pairings-based scheme for regular languages [Waters 2012] .
We now move on to provide a technical roadmap of our construction: first, we define a new primitive that we call a two-to-one recoding (TOR) scheme; we then show how TOR gives us an attribute-based encryption scheme for circuits and how to construct a TOR scheme from the LWE assumption.
New Framework: TOR
A two-to-one recoding (TOR) scheme is a family of (probabilistic) functions {Encode(pk, ·)} indexed by pk, together with a "two-to-one" recoding mechanism. The basic computational security guarantee for Encode(pk, ·) is that of (correlated) pseudorandomness [Rosen and Segev 2010] : Encode(pk, s) should be pseudorandom given Encode(pk i , s) for polynomially many pk i 's, where s is a uniformly random "seed."
The recoding mechanism guarantees that given any triple of public keys (pk 0 , pk 1 , pk tgt ), there is a recoding key rk that allows us to perform the transformation (Encode(pk 0 , s), Encode(pk 1 , s)) → Encode(pk tgt , s).
Such a recoding key rk can be generated using either of the two secret keys sk 0 or sk 1 . Furthermore, the recoding mechanism must satisfy a natural simulation requirement: namely, we can generate rk given just pk 0 , pk 1 (and neither of the two secret keys), if we are allowed to "program" pk tgt . That is, there are three ways of generating the pair (pk tgt , rk) that are (statistically) indistinguishable: (1) given pk tgt , generate rk using the secret key sk 0 ; (2) given pk tgt , generate rk using the secret key sk 1 ; and (3) generate rk without either secret key by "programming" the output public key pk tgt .
This requirement demonstrates the intuitive guarantee that we expect from a two-toone recoding mechanism: namely, the recoding key is "useless" given only one encoding, but not both encodings. For example, it is easy to see that given Encode(pk 0 , s) and rk (but not Encode(pk 1 , s)), the output Encode(pk tgt , s) is pseudorandom. Indeed, this is because rk could as well have been "simulated" using sk 1 , in which case it is of no help in the distinguishing task.
The simulation requirement also rules out the trivial construction from trapdoor functions, where rk is a trapdoor for inverting Encode(pk 0 , ·) or Encode(pk 1 , ·).
From TOR to Garbled Circuits. We start from the observation that our TOR primitive implies a form of reusable garbled circuits with no input or circuit privacy, but instead with a form of authenticity guarantee. As we will see, this leads directly into our attribute-based encryption scheme.
Consider a two-input boolean gate with input wires u, v and output wire w, computing a function G : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1}. In Yao's garbled circuit construction, we associate each wire u with a pair of strings (called "labels") L u,0 , L u,1 . In addition, there is an associated translation table comprising of four values v b,c for b, c ∈ {0, 1}, where v b,c allows us to perform the transformation. G(b,c) .
The garbled circuits construction guarantees that given the translation table and labels L u,b * and L v,c * on input wires u, v for specific input bits b * and c * , we can obtain L w,G(b * ,c * ) (i.e., the label for wire w for output bit G(b * , c * )); however, the other label at the output, namely, L w,1−G(b * ,c * ) , remains hidden. 1 In our setting, we replace labels with public keys so that each wire is associated with a pair of public keys. As before, we also provide a translation table comprising four values rk b,c , where the recoding key rk b,c allows us to perform the transformation
The security properties of the TOR scheme then give us the following guarantee: Given the translation table and encodings of s corresponding to b * , c * , we clearly compute the encoding of s corresponding to G(b * , c * ). However, the encoding corresponding to 1 − G(b * , c * ) remains pseudorandom.
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Moreover, crucially, the translation table is independent of s, so we can now "reuse" the translation table by providing fresh encodings with different choices of s. In a sentence, replacing strings by functions gives us the power of reusability.
In the garbled circuits construction, the four entries of the table are permuted and thus one can perform the translation even without knowing what the input bits b * and c * are. This is possible because there is an efficient way to verify when the "correct" translation key is being used. In contrast, in the preceding, reusable construction, one has to know exactly which of the recoding keys to use. This is part of the reason why we are unable to provide circuit or input privacy, but instead, only guarantee authenticity, namely, that an adversary can obtain only one of the two possible encodings at the output wire.
This construction forms the cornerstone of the subsequent work of Goldwasser et al. [2013] who construct reusable garbled circuits with input and circuit privacy by additionally leveraging the power of fully homomorphic encryption [Gentry 2009; Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan 2011] .
From TOR to Attribute-Based Encryption. How is all this related to attribute-based encryption? In our attribute-based encryption scheme for circuits, the encodings of s are provided in the ciphertext, and the translation tables are provided in the secret key. More precisely, each wire is associated with two TOR public keys, and the encryption of a message m under an index ind is obtained by computing Encode(pk i,ind i , s) for every input wire i. The output encoding Encode(pk out , s) is then used to mask the message. We obtain the secret key corresponding to a circuit C by "stitching" multiple translation tables together, where the public keys for the input and output wires are provided in the public parameters, and we pick fresh public keys for the internal wires during key generation. In a nutshell, this gives us the guarantee that given a secret key sk C and an encryption Enc(ind, m) such that C(ind) = 1, we can compute Encode(pk out , s) and thus recover the message. On the other hand, this value looks pseudorandom if C(ind) = 0.
In our outline of reusable garbled circuits with authenticity, we want to reuse the garbled circuit G(C) across multiple encryptions with indices ind 1 , ind 2 , . . . on which C always evaluates to 0. In attribute-based encryption, we also want reusability across multiple circuits C 1 , C 2 , . . . , all of which evaluate to 0 on a fixed index ind (in addition to multiple indices). Fortunately, the strong security properties of the TOR primitive provide us with this guarantee.
To obtain attribute-based encryption for branching programs, we are able to support a different notion of translation tables, which we can realize using a slightly weaker notion of TOR. In branching programs, the transition function depends on an input variable and the current state. The fact that one of these two values is always an input variable makes things simpler; in circuits, both of the input values to a gate could be internal wires.
TOR from LWE. We show how to instantiate TOR from LWE, building upon previous lattice-based IBE techniques [Gentry et al. 2008; Cash et al. 2012; Agrawal et al. 2010a; 2010b] . The public key is given by a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q , and
where s ∈ Z n q , e ∈ Z m q is an error vector, and A T denotes the transpose of the matrix A. (Correlated) pseudorandomness follows directly from the LWE assumption. Given A 0 , A 1 , A tgt ∈ Z n×m q , the recoding key rk is given by a low-norm matrix R ∈ Z 2m×m q such that
Note that
which gives us the recoding mechanism. There are three ways of generating the public key A tgt together with the recoding key R: (1) using the trapdoor for A 0 , (2) using the trapdoor for A 1 , or (3) first generating R and then "programming" A tgt := [A 0 ||A 1 ] R. These three ways are statistically indistinguishable by the "bonsai trick" of Cash et al. [2012] . In fact, our recoding mechanism is very similar to the lattice delegation mechanism introduced in Agrawal et al. [2010b] , which also uses random low-norm matrices to move from one lattice to another. The multiplicative mechanism for recoding means that the noise grows exponentially with the number of sequential recodings. This, in turn, limits the depth of the circuits we can handle. In particular, the noise grows by a multiplicative poly(n) factor on each recoding, which means that after depth d, it becomes n O(d) . Since n O(d) < q/4 < 2 n , we can handle circuits of depthÕ(n ) (here, the first inequality is for correctness and the second for security). Viewed differently, setting the LWE dimension n = d 1/ lets us handle circuits of maximum depth d = d( ).
Our weak TOR for branching programs uses an additive mechanism, namely, the recoding key is given by a low-norm matrix
s, which gives us our recoding mechanism. Since in our branching program construction, A T 0 s + e 0 will always be a fresh encoding provided in the ciphertext, the noise accumulation is additive rather than multiplicative.
Applications
Let us now explain the application of our result to the problem of publicly verifiable delegation of computation without input privacy.
A verifiable delegation scheme allows a computationally weak client to delegate expensive computations to the cloud with the assurance that a malicious cloud cannot convince the client to accept an incorrect computation [Micali 2000; Goldwasser et al. 2008; Gennaro et al. 2010; Chung et al. 2010; Applebaum et al. 2010] . Recent work by Parno et al. [2012] showed that any attribute-based encryption scheme for a class of circuits with encryption time at most linear in the length of the index immediately yields a two-message delegation scheme for the class in the preprocessing model. Namely, there is an initial preprocessing phase which fixes the circuit C the client wishes to compute, produces a circuit key, and sends it to the server. Afterwards, to delegate computation on an input x, the client only needs to send a single message. Moreover, the ensuing delegation scheme satisfies public delegatability, namely, anyone can delegate computations to the cloud as well as public verifiability, namely, anyone can check the cloud's work (given a "verification" key published by the client). The previous delegation schemes that satisfy both these properties (secure in the standard model) supported the class NC 1 [Parno et al. 2012; Goyal et al. 2006; Lewko and Waters 2012] . Our attribute-based encryption schemes for circuits gives us a verifiable delegation scheme for all circuits, where the computation time of the client in the online phase is polynomial in the length of its input and the depth of the circuit but is otherwise independent of the circuit size. We note that this scheme does not guarantee privacy of the input. Building on this work, Goldwasser et al. [2013] show how to achieve a publicly verifiable delegation scheme with input privacy.
Prior to this work, the state of the art for lattice-based predicate encryption was threshold and inner product predicates [Agrawal et al. 2012 [Agrawal et al. , 2011 ; realizing Boolean formula was itself an open problem. A different line of work considers definitional issues in the more general realm of functional encryption [Boneh et al. 2011; O'Neill 2010] , for which general feasibility results are known for the restricted setting of a-priori bounded collusions developed from classical "one-time" garbled circuits [Sahai and Seyalioglu 2010; Gorbunov et al. 2012 ] (the ciphertext size grows with both the circuit size and the collusion bound). Our methodology takes a fresh perspective on how to achieve reusability of garbled circuits with respect to authenticity. Our primitive (TOR) can be thought of as a generalization of the notion of proxy re-encryption [Blaze et al. 1998; Ateniese et al. 2006; which can be thought of as a one-to-one re-encryption mechanism.
Note that in attribute-based encryption, we do not hide the set of attributes. However, if the attributes were hidden, then this would lead to a general solution for keywordbased search over encrypted data Ostrovsky and Skeith 2005] . 2 In particular, we can view the attributes as keywords and secret keys for circuit as the search queries.
Independent Work. Boyen [2013] gave a construction of an ABE scheme for Boolean formulas based on LWE; our result for LWE-based branching program subsumes the result, since Boolean formulas are a subclass of branching programs. Garg et al. [2013] gave a construction of attribute-based encryption for general circuits under a DBDHlike assumption in multilinear groups; the construction extends to so-called graded encodings for which we have candidates under nonstandard assumptions in ideal lattices [Garg et al. 2012; Coron et al. 2013 ]. The public parameters in the construction also grow with the depth of the circuit. Subsequent Work. Our attribute-based encryption scheme has been used as the crucial component in the subsequent work of Goldwasser et al. [2013] to construct a (private index) functional encryption scheme with succinct ciphertexts. They also show a number of applications of their construction, including reusable garbled circuits with input and circuit privacy. Also, subsequently, Boneh et al. [2014] gave asymptotic improvements on the sizes of secret keys and ciphertexts in two different constructions, respectively. Their main construction which is built from a new fully key-homomorphic encryption, reduces the size of the secret key for a predicate P from |P| × poly(λ, d), shown in this work, to |P| + poly(λ, d), where λ is the security parameter and d is the circuit depth. Moreover, their construction supports arithmetic circuits and key delegation.
Organization. We present our TOR framework and its instantiation in Sections 4 and 5. We present our ABE scheme in Section 6. We present the scheme for branching programs in Section 7.
PRELIMINARIES
Notation. Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial time. For any integer q ≥ 2, we let Z q denote the ring of integers modulo q and we represent Z q as integers in (−q/2, q/2]. We let Z n×m q denote the set of n × m matrices with entries in Z q . We use bold capital letters (e.g., A) to denote matrices and bold lowercase letters (e.g., x) to denote vectors. The notation A T denotes the transpose of the matrix A.
If A 1 is an n×mmatrix and A 2 is an n×m matrix, then [A 1 A 2 ] denotes the n×(m+m ) matrix formed by concatenating A 1 and A 2 . A similar notation applies to vectors. When doing matrix-vector multiplication, we always view vectors as column vectors.
We say a function f (n) is negligible if it is O(n −c ) for all c > 0, and we use negl(n) to denote a negligible function of n. We say f (n) is polynomial if it is O(n c ) for some c > 0, and we use poly(n) to denote a polynomial function of n. We say an event occurs with overwhelming probability if its probability is 1 − negl(n). The function lg x is the base 2 logarithm of x. The notation x denotes the nearest integer to x, rounding towards 0 for half-integers.
Attribute-Based Encryption
We define attribute-based encryption (ABE), following Goyal et al. [2006] . An ABE scheme ABE for a class of predicate circuits C (namely, circuits with a single bit output) consists of four PPT algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec).
-Setup(1 λ , 1 ) → (pp, mpk, msk). The setup algorithm gets as input the security parameter λ, the length of the index, and outputs the public parameter (pp, mpk), and the master key msk. All the other algorithms get pp as part of their inputs. -Enc(mpk, ind, m) → ct ind . The encryption algorithm gets as input mpk, an index ind ∈ {0, 1} , and a message m ∈ M. It outputs a ciphertext ct ind . Note that ind is public
The key generation algorithm gets as input msk and a predicate specified by C ∈ C. It outputs a secret key sk C (where C is also public).
The decryption algorithm gets as input sk C and ct ind and outputs either ⊥ or a message m ∈ M.
Correctness. We define and realize perfect correctness of the ABE scheme. Namely, for all (ind, C) such that C(ind) = 1, all m ∈ M and ct ind ← Enc(mpk, ind, m),
Security Definition. For a stateful adversary A (that can maintain a global state information throughout the execution of the experiment), we define the advantage function Adv ABE
with the restriction that all queries C that A makes to KeyGen(msk, ·) satisfies C(ind) = 0 (i.e., sk C does not decrypt ct ind ). An attribute-based encryption scheme is selectively secure if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage Adv ABE A (λ) is a negligible function in λ. We call an attribute-based encryption scheme fully secure if the adversary A is allowed to choose the challenge index ind after seeing secret keys, namely, along with choosing (m 0 , m 1 ).
Gaussian Distribution and Learning with Errors (LWE) Assumption
Gaussian Distributions. For any positive parameter σ ∈ R >0 , let ρ σ (x) := exp(−π x 2 /σ 2 ) be the Gaussian function on R m with parameter σ (and center 0). Let ρ σ (Z m ) := x∈Z m ρ σ (x) be the discrete integral of ρ σ over Z m (which always converges). Let D Z m ,σ be the truncated discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m with parameter σ .
Specifically, for all y ∈ Z m , we have D Z m ,σ (y) = ρ σ (y) ρ σ (Z m ) . Moreover, when we sample from D Z m ,σ and || · || ∞ norm exceeds √ m · σ , we replace the output by 0.
The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [2009] , who showed that solving it on the average is as hard as solving (quantumly) several standard lattice problems, such as GapSVP and SIVP, in the worst case.
Definition 3.1 (dLWE-Assumption). For an integer q = q(n) ≥ 2 and a (truncated) discrete Gaussian error distribution χ = χ (n) over Z q , the learning with errors assumption dLWE n,m,q,χ states that it is computationally hard to distinguish between the following pairs of distributions:
There are known quantum [Regev 2009 ] and classical [Peikert 2009 ] reductions between dLWE n,m,q,χ and approximating short vector problems in lattices in the worst case, where χ is a B-bounded (truncated) discretized Gaussian for some appropriate B. The state-of-the-art algorithms for these lattice problems run in time nearly exponential in the dimension n [Ajtai et al. 2001; Micciancio and Voulgaris 2010] ; more generally, we can get a 2 k -approximation in time 2Õ (n/k) . Combined with the connection to LWE, this means that the dLWE n,m,q,χ assumption is quite plausible for a poly(n)-bounded distribution χ and q as large as 2 n (for any constant 0 < < 1). Throughout this article, the parameter m = poly(n), in which case we will shorten the notation slightly to LWE n,q,χ .
Trapdoors for Lattices
The following lemma summarizes results about lattice trapdoors and algorithms needed for our construction [Ajtai 1999; Gentry et al. 2008; Micciancio and Peikert 2012] .
LEMMA 3.2 (LATTICE TRAPDOORS). There is an efficient randomized algorithm TrapSamp(1 n , 1 m , q) that, given any integers n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2 and sufficiently large m = (n log q), outputs a parity check matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and a 'trapdoor' matrix T ∈ Z m×m such that the distribution of A is negl(n)-close to uniform.
Moreover, there is an efficient algorithm SampleD that with overwhelming probability over all random choices, does the following: For any u ∈ Z n q , and large enough s = ( nlog q), the randomized algorithm SampleD(A, T, u, s) outputs a vector r ∈ Z m with norm ||r|| ∞ ≤ ||r|| 2 ≤ s √ n (with probability 1). Furthermore, the following distributions of the tuple (A, T, U, R) are within negl(n) statistical distance of each other for any polynomial k ∈ N.
An overview of TOR is provided in Section 2.2. We first informally point out some properties of the encryption/decryption algorithms that are a part of TOR. Then, in Section 4.1, we provide a formal definition of all TOR algorithms and properties.
Symmetric Encryption. In our construction, we will use Encode(pk, s) as a one-time key for a symmetric-key encryption scheme (E, D). If Encode is deterministic, then we could simply use a one-time pad. However, since Encode is probabilistic, the one-time pad will not guarantee correctness. Instead, we require (E, D) to satisfy a stronger correctness guarantee, namely, for all messages m and for all ψ, ψ in the support of Encode(pk, s),
Allowing Degradation. With each recoding operation, the "quality" of encoding potentially degrades. In order to formalize this, we allow the initial global public parameters to depend on d max , an a-prior upper bound on the number of nested recoding operations. We then require that given any encodings ψ and ψ that are a result of at most d max nested recodings, D(ψ , E(ψ, m)) = m. We stress that we allow d max to be superpolynomial, and in fact, provide such instantiations for a relaxed notion of TOR.
Definition of TOR
Formally, a TOR scheme over the input space S = {S λ } and output space K = {K λ } consists of six polynomial-time algorithms (Params, Keygen, Encode, ReKeyGen, SimReKeyGen, Recode) and a symmetric-key encryption scheme (E, D) with the following properties.
-Params(1 λ , d max ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ and an upper bound d max on the number of nested recoding operations (written in binary), and then outputs "global" public parameters pp. -Keygen(pp) is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk).
-Encode(pk, s) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes pk and an input s ∈ S and, then outputs an encoding ψ.
In addition, there is a recoding mechanism together with two ways to generate recoding keys: given one of the two secret keys or by programming the output public key.
-ReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 0 , pk tgt ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a key pair (pk 0 , sk 0 ), another public key pk 1 , a "target" public key pk tgt , and outputs a recoding key rk. -SimReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 ) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes two public keys pk 0 , pk 1 and outputs a recoding key rk together with a "target" public key pk tgt . -Recode(rk, ψ 0 , ψ 1 ) is a deterministic algorithm that takes the recoding key rk, two encodings ψ 0 and ψ 1 , and outputs an encoding ψ tgt .
Remark 4.1. For our instantiation from lattices, we can in fact invert Encode(pk, s) to recover s using the corresponding sk. However, we will not require this property in our generic constructions from TOR. Indeed, realizing this property over bilinear groups would be hard, since s is typically encoded in the exponent.
Correctness. Correctness of a TOR scheme requires two things. First, for sufficiently large λ, for every pk and s ∈ S, there exists a family of sets pk,s, j , j = 0, 1, . . . , d max .
-Pr[Encode(pk, s) ∈ pk,s,0 ] = 1, where the probability is taken over the coin tosses of Encode; pk,s,0 ⊆ pk,s,1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ pk,s,d max .
-For all ψ, ψ ∈ pk,s,d max and all m ∈ M, D(ψ , E(ψ, m)) = m.
Note that these properties hold trivially if Encode is deterministic and (E, D) is the one-time pad. Second, the correctness of recoding requires that for any triple of key pairs (pk 0 , sk 0 ), (pk 1 , sk 1 ), (pk tgt , sk tgt ) and any encodings ψ 0 ∈ pk 0 ,s, j 0 and ψ 1 ∈ pk 1 ,s, j 1 ,
Statistical Security Properties. Note that we have three ways of sampling recoding keys: using ReKeyGen along with one of two secret keys sk 0 or sk 1 ; using SimReKeyGen while programming pk tgt . We require that for all λ, all three ways lead to the same distribution of recoding keys, up to some statistical error.
(Key Indistinguishability). Let (pk b , sk b ) ← Keygen(pp) for b = 0, 1 and (pk tgt , sk tgt ) ← Keygen(pp). Then, for all λ, the following two ensembles must be statistically indistinguishable:
Aux, ReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 0 , pk tgt ) s ≈ , Aux, ReKeyGen(pk 1 , pk 0 , sk 1 , pk tgt ) ,
where Aux = ((pk 0 , sk 0 ), (pk 1 , sk 1 ), (pk tgt , sk tgt )). Informally, this says that sampling recoding keys using sk 0 or sk 1 yields the same distribution.
(Recoding Simulation). Let (pk b , sk b ) ← Keygen(pp) for b = 0, 1. Then, for all λ, the following two ways of sampling the tuple [(pk 0 , sk 0 ), (pk 1 , sk 1 ), pk tgt , rk] must be statistically indistinguishable:
(pk 0 , sk 0 ), (pk 1 , sk 1 ), pk tgt , rk : (pk tgt , sk tgt ) ← Keygen(pp); rk ← ReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 0 , pk tgt ) s ≈ , (pk 0 , sk 0 ), (pk 1 , sk 1 ), pk tgt , rk : (pk tgt , rk) ← SimReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 ) .
In addition, we require one-time semantic security for (E, D).
(One-Time Semantic Security). For all m 0 , m 1 ∈ M and all λ, the following two distributions must be statistically indistinguishable:
For all three properties, computational indistinguishability is sufficient for our applications, but we will achieve the stronger statistical indistinguishability in our instantiations.
Computational Security Property. We require that for all λ, given the encoding of a random s on = poly(λ) keys, the evaluation at a fresh key is pseudorandom.
. Then, the following two ensembles must be computationally indistinguishable:
That is, we define the advantage function Adv CP A (λ) to be
and we require that for all PPT A, the advantage function Adv CP A (λ) is a negligible function in λ.
Simple Applications of TOR
In this section, we provide high-level sketches of how to use TOR to construct an analogue of Yao's garbled circuits (without privacy) and identity-based encryption (IBE).
First Example. We revisit the example from Section 2.2. Consider a two-input boolean gate g with input wires u, v and output wire w, computing a function G : {0, 1}×{0, 1} → {0, 1}. Analogous to Yao's garbled circuit, we provide a translation table comprising four values
where rk b,c allows us to perform the transformation.
. Given an encoding of s corresponding to b * and c * , we can compute that for d * using the recoding key rk b * ,c * ; in addition, we claim that the encoding corresponding to 1 − d * remains pseudorandom. To prove this, it suffices to simulate given pk u,b * , pk v,c * , pk w,1−d * as follows:
-we sample (pk w,d * , rk b * ,c * ) using SimReKeyGen; -we sample pk u,1−b * and pk v,1−c * along with the corresponding secret keys; using these secret keys, we can sample the other three recoding keys rk 1−b * ,c * , rk b * ,1−c * , rk 1−b * ,1−c * .
IBE from TOR. As a warm-up, we show how to build a selectively secure IBE for identity space {0, 1} .
mpk := pk 1,0 pk 2,0 . . . pk ,0 pk start pk 1,1 pk 2,1 . . . pk ,1 pk out . .
The ciphertext for identity ind and message m is given by.
Encode (pk 1,ind 1 , s) , . . . , Encode(pk ,ind , s), Encode(pk start , s), E(Encode(pk out , s), m) .
The secret key for identity ind is given by (rk 1 , . . . , rk ), where we first sample (pk 1 , sk 1 ), . . . , (pk −1 , sk −1 ) ← Keygen(pp), and then sample rk 1 ← ReKeyGen(pk start , pk 1,ind 1 , sk start , pk 1 ) rk 2 ← ReKeyGen(pk 1 , pk 2,ind 2 , sk 1 , pk 2 ) . . .
rk ← ReKeyGen(pk −1 , pk ,ind , sk −1 , pk out ).
To prove selective security, we need to generate secret keys for any ind = ind * , given sk 1,1−ind * 1 , . . . , sk ,1−ind * but not sk start or sk out . We can achieve this as follows. Pick an i for which ind i = ind * i : -pick (rk 1 , pk 1 ), . . . , (rk i−1 , pk i−1 ) using SimReKeyGen; -pick (pk i , sk i ), . . . , (pk −1 , sk −1 ) using Keygen; -pick rk i , rk i+1 , . . . , rk using ReKeyGen with secret keys sk 1−ind * i , sk i , . . . , sk −1 , respectively.
We note that our IBE construction from TOR seems incomparable to existing IBE constructions from lattices [Cash et al. 2012; Agrawal et al. 2010a ], as we follow more of a "sequential" binding to the identity ind.
TOR FROM LWE
In this section, we present an instantiation of TOR from LWE, building upon ideas previously introduced in [Gentry et al. 2008; Cash et al. 2012; Agrawal et al. 2010a Agrawal et al. , 2010b .
LEMMA 5.1. Assuming dLWE n,q,χ there is a TOR scheme that is correct up to d max levels, where n = n(λ), χ = D Z, -ReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 , sk b , pk tgt ). Let pk 0 = A 0 , pk 1 = A 1 , sk b = T b , and pk tgt = A tgt .
Compute the matrix R ∈ Z 2m×m in the following way.
(i) Choose a discrete Gaussian matrix R 1−b ← (D Z,s ) m×m . Namely, each entry of the matrix is an independent sample from the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,s .
(iii) Compute the matrix R b by running the algorithm SampleD to compute a matrix R b ∈ Z m×m as follows:
Output rk tgt 0,1 :=
-SimReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 ). Let pk 0 = A 0 and pk 1 = A 1 . (i) Sample a matrix R ← (D Z,s ) 2m×m by sampling each entry from the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,s . (ii) Define
Output the pair (pk tgt := A tgt , rk 
We also need a one-time symmetric encryption scheme (E, D), which we will instantiate as an error-tolerant version of the one-time pad with K = Z m q , M = {0, 1} m , as follows.
-E(ψ, μ) takes as input a vector ψ ∈ Z m q and a bit string μ ∈ M m and outputs the encryption γ := ψ + q/2 μ (mod q).
-D(ψ , γ ) takes as input a vector ψ = (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m ) ∈ Z m q , an encryption γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ n ) ∈ Z m q , and does the following. Define a function Round(
The decryption algorithm outputs a vector μ = (Round(γ 1 − ψ 1 ), . . . , Round(γ n − ψ n )).
The scheme is information-theoretically secure for a one-time use. As for correctness, we will show that for every two ψ and ψ that are "close", D(ψ , E(ψ, μ)) = μ. More precisely, call ψ and ψ close if for every
Observe that if |ψ i − ψ i | < q/4, then Round(μ i q/2 + ψ i − ψ i ) = μ i . This completes the proof of correctness.
Analysis
Correctness. We define the sets A,s, j for pk := A ∈ Z n×m q , s ∈ Z n q , and j ∈ [1 . . . d max ] as follows:
Given this definition, observe the following. 
which holds as long as n · O(n 2 log q) d max < q/4. Thus, ψ and ψ are "close", and by the correctness property of the symmetric encryption scheme (E, D) previously described, D(ψ , E(ψ, μ)) = μ for any μ ∈ {0, 1} n . -Consider two encodings ψ 0 ∈ A 0 ,s, j 0 and ψ 1 ∈ A 1 ,s, j 1 for any j 0 , j 1 ∈ N, any A 0 , A 1 ∈ Z n×m q , and s ∈ Z n q . Then, ψ 0 = A T 0 s + e 0 and ψ 1 :
Then, the recoded ciphertext ψ tgt is computed as follows.
where the last equation is because A tgt = [A 0 || A 1 ] R tgt 0,1 , and we define e tgt := [e T 0 || e T 1 ] R tgt 0,1 . Thus,
exactly as required. Here, the second inequality is because ||R tgt 0,1 || ∞ ≤ s √ m by Lemma 3.2. This finishes our proof of correctness.
Key Indistinguishability. Recall that in ReKeyGen, we are given samplings (R 0 , R 1 )
In key indistinguishability, we must argue that the distributions produced by sampling using a trapdoor for A 0 or that for A 1 are indistinguishable. Indeed, this follows directly from the following statement in Cash et al. [2012] and Gentry et al. [2008] (see also [Cash et al. 2009 , Theorem 3.4]): for every (A 0 , T 0 ), (A 1 , T 1 ) generated by TrapSamp (1 n , 1 m , q) , every matrix A tgt ∈ Z n×m q , and any s = ( n log q), the following two experiments generate distributions with negl(n) statistical distance.
Note that in both distributions, it clearly holds that A 0 R 0 + A 1 R 1 = A t gt, as required.
The recoding simulation property follows readily from Lemma 3.2, as is done in Cash et al. [2012] . In particular, given [(A 0 , T 0 ), (A 1 , T 1 ), A tgt , (R 0 , R 1 )], from Lemma 3.2, it follows that if we are given A tgt , then we may sample (R 0 , R 1 ) using the trapdoor T 0 . Alternatively, sampling (R 0 , R 1 ) first and setting A tgt = A 0 R 0 + A 1 R 1 produces the same distribution.
Correlated pseudorandomness directly from the decisional LWE assumption dLWE n,( +1)·m,q,χ , where q = n (d max ) . In particular, by the dLWE, given A 1 , . . . , A +1 , ψ 1 , . . . , ψ , ψ * , no adversary can distinguish between the cases when ψ * is a valid LWE sample under key A +1 or a randomly chosen value from Z m q .
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION FOR CIRCUITS
In this section, we show how to construct attribute-based encryption for circuits from any TOR scheme. 3 Let TOR be the scheme consisting of algorithms (Params, Keygen, Encode) with the "two-to-one" recoding mechanism (Recode, ReKeyGen, SimReKeyGen) with input space S. For every d max , let d max -TOR denote a secure "twoto-one" recoding scheme that is correct for d max recoding levels. THEOREM 6.1. For every and polynomial d max = d max (λ), let C ,d max denote a family of polynomial-size circuits of depth at most d max that take bits of input. Assuming the existence of a d max -TOR scheme, there exists a selectively secure attribute-based encryption scheme ABE for C ,d max .
Combining Theorem 6.1 and Lemma 5.1, we obtain a selectively secure attributebased encryption scheme from LWE. Furthermore, invoking an argument from Boneh and Boyen [2004, Theorem 7 .1], and using subexponential hardness of LWE, we obtain a fully secure scheme. COROLLARY 6.2. For all and polynomial d max = d max ( ), there exists a selectively secure attribute-based encryption scheme ABE for any family of polynomial-size circuits with inputs and depth at most d max , assuming the hardness of dLWE n,q,χ for sufficiently large n = poly(λ, d max ), q = n O(d max ) , and some poly(n)-bounded error distribution χ .
Moreover, assuming 2 O( ) -hardness of dLWE n,q,χ for parameters n = poly(λ, d max , ) and q and χ as previously, the attribute-based encryption scheme ABE is fully secure.
The reader is referred to the text after the construction for further explanation of how to choose the LWE parameters. It remains an intriguing open problem to construct fully secure without complexity leveraging (whereas a generic transformation from selective to fully secure functional encryption (more powerful primitive than ABE) is already known [Ananth et al. 2014] ).
Observe that if we start with a TOR scheme that supports d max = ω(1) , then our construction immediately yields an attribute-based encryption scheme for arbitrary polynomial-size circuit families (without any restriction on the depth). This can be achieved if, for example, we had an LWE-based TOR scheme, where q grows polynomially instead of exponentially in d max , as in our LWE-based weak TOR.
We now prove Theorem 6.1.
Circuit Representation. Let C λ be a collection of circuits each having = (λ) input wires and one output wire. Define a collection C = {C λ } λ∈N . For each C ∈ C λ , we index the wires of C in the following way. The input wires are indexed 1 to , the internal wires have indices + 1, + 2, . . . , |C| − 1, and the output wire has index |C|, which also denotes the size of the circuit. We assume that the circuit is composed of arbitrary twoto-one gates. Each gate g is indexed as a tuple (u, v, w) , where u and v are the incoming wire indices and w > max{u, v} is the outgoing wire index. The gate computes the function g w : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0, 1}. The "fan-out wires" in the circuit are given a single number. That is, if the outgoing wire of a gate feeds into the input of multiple gates, then all these wires are indexed the same. (See, e.g., [Bellare et al. 2012 , Fig. 4 ].)
Construction from TOR
The ABE scheme ABE = (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec) is defined as follows.
Setup (1 λ , 1 , d max ) For each of the input wires, generate two public/secret key pairs. Also, generate an additional public/secret key pair:
(pk out , sk out ) ← Keygen(pp).
Output mpk := pk 1,0 pk 2,0 . . . pk ,0 pk 1,1 pk 2,1 . . . pk ,1 pk out msk := sk 1,0 sk 2,0 . . . sk ,0 sk 1,1 sk 2,1 . . . sk ,1 .
Enc (mpk, ind, m) . For ind ∈ {0, 1} , choose a uniformly random s $ ← S and encode it under the public keys specified by the index bits:
Encrypt the message m.
τ ← E(Encode(pk out , s), m).
Output the ciphertext ct ind := ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ , τ, ind. .
KeyGen(msk, C).
(1) For every non-input wire w = + 1, . . . , |C| of the circuit C and every b ∈ {0, 1}, generate public/secret key pairs. (pk w,b , sk w,b ) ← Keygen(pp) if w < |C| or b = 0, and set pk |C|,1 := pk out .
(2) For the gate g = (u, v, w) with outgoing wire w, compute the four recoding keys rk w b,c
. Output the secret key which is a collection of 4(|C| − ) recoding keys: If C(ind) = 0, output ⊥.
LWE Parameters. Fix
= (λ) and d max = d max ( ), and suppose the dLWE n,m,q,χ assumption holds for q = 2 n for some 0 < < 1. Then, in our LWE-based TOR, we will set: n =˜ d 1/ max and q = n (d max ) .
By Corollary 6.2, we get security under 2 n -LWE.
Correctness
LEMMA 6.3 (CORRECTNESS). Let C = {C λ } λ∈N be a family, where each C λ is a finite collection of polynomial-size circuits each of depth at most d max . Let TOR be a correct two-to-one recoding scheme for d max levels. Then, the construction presented previously is a correct attribute-based encryption scheme.
PROOF. Fix a circuit C of depth at most d max and an input ind such that C(ind) = 1. Informally, we rely on recoding correctness for d max recodings to show that w = 1, . . . , |C|; we have where d * is the value carried by the wire w and ψ w,d * is computed as in Dec. Formally, we proceed via induction on w to show that
where j is the depth of wire w. The base case w = 1, . . . , follows immediately from correctness of Encode. For the inductive step, consider a wire w at depth j for some gate g = (u, v, w) , where u, v < w. By the induction hypothesis,
where j 0 , j 1 < j denote the depths of wires u and v, respectively. It follows immediately from the correctness of Recode that ψ w,d * ∈ pk w,d * ,s,max(i 0 ,i 1 )+1 ⊆ pk w,d * ,s, j , which completes the inductive proof. Since C(ind) = 1 and pk |C|,1 = pk out , we have ψ |C|,1 ∈ pk out ,s,d max . Finally, by the correctness of (E, D), D(ψ |C|,1 , τ ) = m.
Security
LEMMA 6.4 (SELECTIVE SECURITY). For any adversary A against selective security of the attribute-based encryption scheme, there exists an adversary B against correlated pseudorandomness of TOR whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
, where negl(λ) captures the statistical security terms in TOR.
We begin by describing alternative algorithms, which would be useful later for constructing the adversary B for the correlated pseudorandomness security game.
Alternative Algorithms. Fix the selective challenge ind. We get from the "outside" the challenge pp, (pk i , ψ i ) i∈[ +1] for correlated pseudorandomness. The main challenge is to design an alternative algorithm KeyGen * for answering secret key queries without knowing sk 1,ind 1 , . . . , sk ,ind or sk out . The algorithm KeyGen * will maintain the following invariant: on input C with C(ind) = 0, for every non-output wire w = 1, . . . , |C| − 1 carrying the value b * , we will know sk w,1−b * , but not sk w,b * .
Moreover, we do not know sk |C|,0 or sk |C|,1 = sk out . Setup * (ind, 1 λ , 1 , d max ). Let
Output mpk = pk 1,0 pk 2,0 . . . pk ,0 pk 1,1 pk 2,1 . . . pk ,1 pk out .
Enc * (mpk, ind, m). Set τ ← E(ψ +1 , m) and output the ciphertext . . . , ψ , τ, ind, ) where ψ 1 , . . . , ψ +1 are provided in the challenge. KeyGen * (ind, msk, C). Where C(ind) = 0, proceed as follows.
(1) For each internal wire w ∈ [ + 1, |C| − 1] of the circuit C carrying the value b * when evaluating C on input ind, generate public/secret key pairs: (pk w,1−b * , sk w,1−b * ) ← Keygen(pp). We will generate pk w,b * using SimReKeyGen as described next.
(2) For w = + 1, . . . , |C|, let g = (u, v, w) denote the gate for which w is the outgoing wire. Suppose wires u and v carry the values b * and c * when C is evaluated on ind so that wire w carries the value d * := g w (b * , c * ). By this invariant, we know sk u,1−b * and sk v,1−c * but not sk u,b * and sk v,c * . We start by generating (pk w,d * , rk w b * ,c * ) ← SimReKeyGen(pk u,b * , pk v,c * ). We generate the other three recoding keys using ReKeyGen as follows: Output the secret key.
. Informally, the recoding key rk w b * ,1−c * looks the same as in Keygen because of key indistinguishability, and rk w b * ,c * (together with the simulated pk w,d * ) looks the same as in Keygen because of the recoding simulation property.
Game Sequence. Next, consider the following sequence of games. We use Adv 0 , Adv 1 , . . . to denote the advantage of the adversary A in Games 0, 1, etc. Game 0 is the real experiment. We then show that the games are either statistically or computationally indistinguishable.
Game i for i = 1, 2, . . . , q. As in Game 0, except the challenger answers the first i key queries using KeyGen * and the remaining q − i key queries using KeyGen. For the ith key query C i , we consider sub-Games i.w as follows.
Game i.w, for w = + 1, . . . , |C i |. The challenger switches (rk w b,c : b, c ∈ {0, 1}) from KeyGen to KeyGen * . More precisely, -we switch (pk w,d * , rk w b * ,c * ) from KeyGen to KeyGen * ; -we switch rk w b * ,1−c * from KeyGen to KeyGen * ; -the other two keys rk w 1−b * ,c * , rk w 1−b * ,1−c * are generated the same way in both KeyGen and KeyGen * . From Lemma 6.5, we have
Note that in Game q, the challenger runs Setup * and answers all key queries using KeyGen * with the selective challenge ind and generates the challenge ciphertext using Enc.
Game q + 1. Same as Game q, except the challenger generates the challenge ciphertext using Enc * with ψ +1 = Encode(pk +1 , s). Clearly,
Game q + 2. Same as Game q + 1, except ψ +1 $ ← K. From Lemma 6.6, there is an adversary B such that |Adv q+1 − Adv q+2 | ≤ Adv CP B (λ). Finally, by the one-time semantic security of (E, D) for all m 0 , m 1 ∈ M, E(ψ +1 , m 0 ) is indistinguishable from E(ψ +1 , m 1 ) (for ψ +1 $ ← K). Therefore, it follows that Adv q+2 ≤ negl(λ), concluding the proof of security. LEMMA 6.5. Games i and i + 1 are (statistically) indistinguishable for all i = 0, . . . , q − 1.
PROOF. In Game i + 1, first i + 1 key queries are answered using KeyGen * and the remaining q − (i + 1) key queries using KeyGen. Consider a key query C i+1 and for all w = , . . . , |C i |, sub-Games (i + 1).w defined previously. We argue that for all w = , . . . , |C i | − 1, sub-Games (i + 1).w and (i + 1).(w + 1) are statistically indistinguishable. Clearly, sub-Game (i + 1). corresponds to Game i, where the (i + 1)th key query is sampled using KeyGen and sub-Game (i + 1).|C i | this corresponds to Game i + 1, where (i + 1)th query is the sampled using KeyGen * (the remaining queries are sampled identically). Now, sub-Games (i + 1).w and (i + 1).(w + 1) differ in how recoding keys (rk w+1 b,c : b, c ∈ {0, 1}) are sampled for query C i+1 . The statistical indistinguishability of keys rk w+1 b * ,c * follows from recoding simulation rk w+1 b * ,1−c * on indistinguishability with respect to sampling using keys sk b * and sk 1−c * , and two other keys rk w+1
are generated identically in two experiments. It follows that the two sub-Games (i+1).w and (i + 1).(w + 1) are statistically indistinguishable, concluding the lemma.
LEMMA 6.6. Games q + 1 and q + 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
PROOF. Suppose there exists an adversary B * that distinguishes between the Games q + 1 and q + 2. We construct an adversary B that breaks the correlated pseudorandomness property. Adversary B gets as input (pk i , ψ i ) i∈[ ] , pk +1 , ψ * , where ψ * is either a valid encoding using key pk +1 or a randomly chosen element. Adversary B uses these values to invoke algorithms Setup * , Enc * , KeyGen * , where it uses ψ +1 := ψ * . It invokes adversary B * and the same thing. Clearly, if ψ * = Encode(pk +1 , s) then this experiment corresponds to Game q + 1. On the other hand, if ψ * $ ← K, then this experiment corresponds to Game q + 2. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION FOR BRANCHING PROGRAMS
In this section, we present weak TOR and attribute-based encryption for branching programs, which capture the complexity class log-space. As noted in Section 2.2, we exploit the fact that in branching programs, the transition function depends on an input variable and the current state; this means that one of the two input encodings during recoding is always a "depth 0" encoding.
Branching Programs. Recall that a branching program is a directed acyclic graph in which every nonterminal node has exactly two outgoing edges labeled (i, 0) and (i, 1) for some i ∈ [ ]. Moreover, there is a distinguished terminal accept node. Every input x ∈ {0, 1} naturally induces a subgraph x containing exactly those edges labeled (i, x i ). We say that accepts x if and only if there is a path from the start node to the accept node in x . At the cost of possibly doubling the number of edges and vertices, we may assume that there is at most one edge connecting any two nodes in .
Weak TOR
A weak two-to-one encoding (wTOR) scheme consists of the same algorithms as TOR, except that Keygen(pp, j) takes an additional input j ∈ {0, 1}. That is, Keygen may produce different distributions of public/secret key pairs depending on j. Moreover, in ReKeyGen, the first public key is always generated using Keygen(pp, 0) and the second using Keygen(pp, 1); similarly, in Recode, the first encoding is always generated with respect to a public key from Keygen(pp, 0) and the second from Keygen(pp, 1). Similarly, the correctness and statistical security properties are relaxed.
Correctness. First, for every pk and s ∈ S, there exists a family of sets pk,s, j , j = 0, 1, . . . , d max .
pk,s,1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ pk,s,d max .
-For all ψ, ψ ∈ pk,s,d max and all m ∈ M, E(ψ, m) 
Second, the correctness of recoding requires that for any triple of key pairs (pk 0 , sk 0 ), (pk 1 , sk 1 ), (pk tgt , sk tgt ), respectively, in the support of Keygen(pp, 0), Keygen(pp, 1), Keygen(pp, 1) and any encodings ψ 0 ∈ Encode(pk 0 , s) and ψ 1 ∈ pk 1 ,s, j 1 , where 0 < j 1 , Recode(rk, ψ 0 , ψ 1 ) ∈ pk tgt ,s, j 1 +1 .
Statistical Security Properties. We require recoding simulation as before, but not key indistinguishability. However, we require the following additional property.
(Back-Tracking). For all (pk 0 , sk 0 ) ← Keygen(pp, 0) and all (pk 1 , sk 1 ), (pk tgt , sk tgt ) ← Keygen(pp, 1), the following distributions are identical.
ReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk 1 , sk 0 , pk tgt ) ≡ −ReKeyGen(pk 0 , pk tgt , sk 0 , pk 1 ).
Informally, this says that switching the order of pk 1 and pk tgt as inputs to ReKeyGen is the same as switching the "sign" of the output. In our instantiations, the output of ReKeyGen lies in a group, so negating the output simply refers to applying the group inverse operation.
Computational Security Property. We define the advantage function Adv CP A (λ) (modified to account for the additional input to Keygen) to be the absolute value of
pp ← Setup(1 λ ); s ← S; (pk i , sk i ) ← Keygen(pp, 0), ψ i ← Encode(pk i , s), i = 1, . . . , ; (pk +1 , sk +1 ) ← Keygen(pp, 1);
Remark 7.1. Due to the additional back-tracking property, it is not the case that a TOR implies a weak TOR. However, we are able to instantiate weak TOR under weaker and larger classes of assumptions than TOR.
Weak TOR from LWE
We provide an instantiation of weak TOR from LWE. The main advantage over our construction of TOR in Section 5 is that the dependency of q on d max is linear in d max instead of exponential. Therefore, if q is quasi-polynomial, we can handle any polynomial d max , as opposed to an a-prior bounded d max .
LEMMA 7.2. Assuming dLWE n,( +2)m,q,χ , where q = O(d max n 3 log n), there is a weak TOR scheme that is correct up to d max levels, where n = n(λ), the error distribution χ = χ (n) = D Z, √ n , the modulus q = q(n) = d max · O(n 3 log n), and the number of samples m = m(n) = O(nlog q).
Note that the parameters here are better than in Lemma 5.1. The construction of weak TOR from learning with errors follows.
-Params(1 λ , d max ). We are given parameters n, m, χ, q, and we set the error bound B = B(n) = O(n); and the Gaussian parameter s = s(n) = O( n log q); output the global public parameters pp = (n, χ, B, q, m, s) ; and define the domain S of the encoding scheme to be Z n q . -Keygen(pp, j) . Run the trapdoor generation algorithm TrapGen(1 n , 1 m , q) to obtain a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q together with the trapdoor T. Outputs pk = A; sk = T.
-Encode (A, s) . Sample an error vector e ← χ m and output the encoding ψ := A T s+e ∈ Z m q . -ReKeyGen(A 0 , A 1 , A tgt , T) . Outputs a low-norm matrix R such that A 0 R = A tgt − A 1 .
In particular,
-SimReKeyGen(A 0 , A 1 ). Sample a matrix R ← (D Z,s ) m×m by sampling each entry from the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,s . Outputs rk := R; A tgt := A 0 R + A 1 .
-Recode(rk, ψ 0 , ψ 1 ). Outputs rk T ψ 0 + ψ 1 .
Correctness. We define the sets A,s, j for pk := A ∈ Z n×m q , s ∈ Z n q , and j ∈ [1 . . . d max ] as follows.
The analysis is similar to that in the previous section. In particular, we observe the following right away.
-A,s,1 ⊆ A,s,1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ A,s,d max .
-For any two encodings ψ, ψ ∈ A,s,d max and μ ∈ {0, 1} n , D(ψ , E(ψ, μ)) = μ, as long as
-Consider two encodings A T s + e ∈ Encode(A, s) and ψ 1 ∈ A 1 ,s, j 1 for any j 1 ∈ N. Then, ψ 0 = A T 0 s + e 0 and ψ 1 := A T 1 s + e 1 , where ||e 0 || ∞ ≤ B and ||e 1 || ∞ ≤ j 1 · B · (sm √ m). Then, the recoded ciphertext ψ tgt is computed as follows:
where the last equation is because A tgt = A 0 R + A 1 , and we define e tgt := R T e 0 + e 1 . Thus,
exactly as required. Here, the second inequality is because ||R|| ∞ ≤ s √ m by Lemma 3.2. This finishes our proof of correctness. and g 1 , g 1 , g a 1 , g a 2 , g
for a randomly chosen c from Z q . Then, we can construct an adversary A that breaks DBDH assumption. In particular, A is given g 1 , g 2 , g a 1 , g a 2 , g b 2 , g s 1 , α, where α is either either g abs T or g c T for a randomly chosen c. Then, the adversary A can simulate components (g a/t 1 , g a/t 2 , (g a/t 1 ) s ) by sampling t and setting t = a/t . Then, g a/t 1 = g t 1 , g a/t 2 = g t 2 and (g a/t 1 ) s = g t s 1 (which can be computed given g s 1 and t ). It can also simulate g b i 2 , e(g a 1 , g b i 2 ) s for all i ≤ , by sampling b i in clear and then using g s 1 , g a 2 , and b i to compute e(g s 1 , g a 2 ) b i = e(g a 1 , g b i 2 ) s . Finally, it sets b +1 := b from the challenge together with α and calls the adversary D to distinguish.
Attribute-Based Encryption from Weak TOR
Setup (1 λ , 1 , d max ) . For each one of input bits, generate two public/secret key pairs. Also, generate a public/secret key pair for the start and accept states:
(pk start , sk start ) ← Keygen(pp, 1), (pk accept , sk accept ) ← Keygen(pp, 1).
Output mpk := pk 1,0 pk 2,0 . . . pk ,0 pk start pk 1,1 pk 2,1 . . . pk ,1 pk accept , msk := sk 1,0 sk 2,0 . . . sk ,0 sk start sk 1,1 sk 2,1 . . . sk ,1 sk accept .
Enc (mpk, ind, m) . For ind ∈ {0, 1} , choose a uniformly random s $ ← S and encode it under the public keys specified by the index bits and the start state:
ψ start ← Encode(pk start , s).
Encrypt the message τ ← E(Encode(pk accept , s), m).
Output the ciphertext ct ind = ( ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ , ψ start , τ ).
KeyGen(msk, ): : {0, 1} → {0, 1} is a branching program that takes a -bit input and outputs a single bit.
-For every node u, except the start and accept nodes, sample public/secret key pair:
(pk u , sk u ) ← Keygen(pp, 1).
-For every edge (u, v) labeled (i, b) in , sample a recoding key rk u,v as follows:
The secret key sk is the collection of all the recoding keys rk u,v for every edge (u, v) in .
Dec(sk , ct ind ). Suppose (ind) = 1; output ⊥ otherwise. Let denote the (directed) path from the start node to the accept node in ind . For every edge (u, v) labeled (i, ind i ) in , apply the recoding algorithm on the two encodings ψ i , ψ u and the recoding key rk u,v :
If (ind) = 1, we obtain ψ accept . Decrypt and output the message m ← D(ψ accept , τ ).
Correctness
LEMMA 7.3 (CORRECTNESS). Let G = { } λ be a collection of polynomial-size branching programs of depth at most d max , and let wTOR be a weak two-to-one recoding scheme for d max levels. Then, the construction previously presented is a correct attribute-based encryption scheme for G.
PROOF. Let denote the directed path from the start to the accept nodes in ind . We shows, via induction on nodes v along the path , that
where j is the depth of node v along the path. The base case for v := start node follows immediately from correctness of Encode. For the inductive step, consider a node v along the path at depth j for some edge (u, v) labeled (i, ind i ). By the induction hypothesis,
where j 0 < j denote the depths of node u. Also by the correctness of the Encode algorithm, for all i ∈ [ ], ψ i ∈ pk i,ind i ,s,0 .
It follows immediately from the correctness of Recode that
which completes the inductive proof. Since C(ind) = 1, we have ψ accept ∈ pk accept ,s,d max .
Recall that τ ← E(Encode(pk accept , s), m). Finally, by the correctness of (E, D),
Selective Security
LEMMA 7.4 (SELECTIVE SECURITY). For any adversary A against selective security of the attribute-based encryption scheme for branching programs, there exists an adversary B against correlated pseudorandomness of wTOR whose running time is essentially the same as that of A, such that
In the proof of security, we will rely crucially on the following combinatorial property of branching programs: for any input x, the graph x does not contain any cycles as an undirected graph.
Alternative Algorithms. Fix the selective challenge ind. We also get a collection of public keys with corresponding encodings from the "outside": (pk i , ψ i ) i∈ [ +2] , where the challenge is to decide whether ψ +1 is Encode(pk +2 , s) or random. The main challenge is designing an alternative algorithm KeyGen * for answering secret key queries without knowing sk 1,ind 1 , . . . , sk ,ind or sk start , sk accept . We consider the following "alternative" algorithms.
Setup * (1 λ , 1 , d max ) . Let
pk start := pk +1 pk accept := pk +2 .
Define and output the master public key as follows. mpk = pk 1,0 pk 2,0 . . . pk ,0 pk start pk 1,1 pk 2,1 . . . pk ,1 pk accept .
Output the simulated ciphertext.
ct ind = ( ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ , ψ start , τ ).
KeyGen * (msk, ). Let ind denote the undirected graph obtained from ind by treating every directed edge as an undirected edge (while keeping the edge label). Observe that ind satisfies the following properties.
ind contains no cycles. This is because ind is acyclic and every nonterminal node contains exactly one outgoing edge. -The start node and the accept node lie in different connected components in ind , since (ind) = 0.
Simulation Invariant. For each "active" edge labeled (i, ind i ) from node u to node v, simulate the recoding key. Choose our own public/secret key pair for each "inactive" edges (i, 1 − ind i ) and generate the recoding key honestly.
-Run a DFS in ind starting from the start node. Whenever we visit a new node v from a node u along an edge labeled (i, ind i ), we set
Here, we exploit the back-tracking property in wTOR. Note that since (ind) = 0, then the accept node is not assigned a public key by this process. -For all nodes u without an assignment, run (pk u , sk u ) ← Keygen(pp, 1).
-For every remaining edge (u, v) labeled (i, 1 − ind i ) in , sample a recoding key rk u,v as in KeyGen using sk i,1−ind as follows.
rk u,v ← ReKeyGen(pk i,1−ind , pk u , sk i,1−ind , pk v ).
The secret key sk is simply the collection of all the recoding keys rk u,v for every edge (u, v) in .
Game Sequence. Next, consider the following sequence of games. We use Adv 0 , Adv 1 , . . . to denote the advantage of the adversary A in Games 0, 1, etc. Let n denote the number of edges in a branching program labeled (i, ind i ) for some i, and for all j ∈ [n], let e j denote the actual edge.
Game 0. Real experiment. Game i for i = 1, 2, . . . , q. As in Game 0, except the challenger answers the first i key queries using KeyGen * and the remaining q − i key queries using KeyGen. For the ith key query i , we also consider sub-Games, as follows.
-Game i. j, for j = 1, . . . , n. For edge e j = (u, v) labeled (i, ind i ), the challenger switches the simulated recoding key rk u,v from KeyGen to KeyGen * . From Lemma 7.5, it follows that
Note that in Game q, the challenger runs Setup * and answers all key queries using KeyGen * with the selective challenge ind and generates the challenge ciphertext using Enc. -Game q+1. Same as Game q, except the challenger generates the challenge ciphertext using Enc * with ψ +2 ← Encode(pk +2 , s).
Adv q+1 = Adv q .
-Game q + 2 Same as Game q + 1, except ψ +2 $ ← K. It is straight forward to construct an adversary B such that |Adv q+1 − Adv q+2 | ≤ Adv CP B (λ). Finally, by the one-time semantic security of (E, D) for all m 0 , m 1 ∈ M, E(ψ +2 , m 0 ) is indistinguishable from E(ψ +2 , m 1 ) (for ψ +2 $ ← K). Therefore, it follows that Adv q+2 ≤ negl(λ), concluding the proof of security.
LEMMA 7.5. Games i and i + 1 are (statistically) indistinguishable for all i = 0, . . . , q − 1. PROOF. The difference in two games is in how the (i + 1)st key query is answered. In Game i, it is answered using KeyGen, whereas in Game i + 1, it is answered using KeyGen * . Now, consider sub-Games (i + 1). j and (i + 1).( j + 1). The difference in these two sub-Games is in the recoding key rk u,v . Now, by the recoding simulation and backtracking, it follows that the keys sampled statistically indistinguishable, concluding the lemma. LEMMA 7.6. Games q + 1 and q + 2 are computationally indistinguishable.
PROOF. Suppose there exists an adversary B * that distinguishes between the Games q + 1 and q + 2. We construct an adversary B that breaks correlated pseudorandomness property. Adversary B gets as input (pk i , ψ i ) i∈[ +1] , pk +2 , ψ * , where ψ * is either a valid encoding using key pk +2 or a randomly chosen element. Adversary B uses these values to invoke algorithms Setup * , Enc * , KeyGen * , where it uses ψ +2 := ψ * . It invokes adversary B * likewise. Clearly, if ψ * = Encode(pk +2 , s), then this experiment corresponds to Game q + 1. On the other hand, if ψ * $ ← K then this experiment corresponds to Game q + 2. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIXES

A. OUTSOURCING DECRYPTION
In this sectio, we show how to modify our main construction of attribute-based encryption to support outsourcing of decryption circuits, similar to . Syntactically, ABE with outsourcing decryption consists of algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Eval, Enc, Dec), satisfying the same semantics as standard ABE, except as follow.
(1) We require that the Keygen algorithm on input (msk, C) returns two keys.
-The evaluation key ek C , given to a computationally powerful proxy.
-And a decryption key dk given to the client. (2) Given a ciphertext ct ind , the proxy must perform the "bulk" of the computation by running Eval(ek C , ct ind ) → ct ind . The client holding the decryption key dk can then compute Dec(dk, ct ind ) → m iff C(ind) = 1.
Formally, we require that the runtime of Dec is poly(λ, d max ), where λ is the security parameter and d max is the maximum circuit depth (in particular, it is independent on the size of C). The other correctness properties are the same as in standard ABE.
We envision a semi-honest proxy server, where it performs all algorithms correctly but tries to learn the message payload. That is, the security ensures that an adversary (that may play proxy's role) should learn nothing about the message, conditioned on that it queries for decryption keys dk's for predicates that are not satisfied by the challenge index (note, the adversary can query for evaluation keys separately for predicates that are satisfied). More formally, for a stateful adversary A (that can maintain a global state information throughout the execution of the experiment), we consider the following game.
-Phase 1. The adversary specifies the challenge index ind, gives it to the challenger who runs the Setup algorithm, and returns the master public key mpk to the adversary. -Phase 2. The adversary may issue oracle queries of the form C to KeyGen algorithm and specify whether to obtain ek C only or both (ek C , dk). It outputs two challenge messages m 0 , m 1 . -Phase 3. The challenger runs ct ind ← Enc(mpk, ind, m b ) for a randomly chosen bit b and gives ct ind to the adversary. -Phase 4. Same as Phase 2, where eventually the adversary outputs a guess bit b .
The ABE with outsourcing decryption capabilities is said to be secure if no adversary can guess the bit b with probability significantly better than 1/2, conditioned on that for all decryption keys dk obtained for predicates C, C(ind) = 0.
We now give a high-level overview of the changes applied to our main construction and then provide a formal construction. As before, the key-generation algorithm assigns two keys for each circuit wire. The evaluation key consists of all the recoding keys for the circuit. In addition, the output wire has another key pk out which now plays a special role. The recoding key from pk |C|,1 to pk out is only given to the client as the decryption key. If C(ind) = 1, the the proxy computes an encoding under the pk |C|,1 and forwards it to the client. The client applies the transformation and decrypts the message. For technical reasons, since we are using two-to-one recoding mechanism, we need to introduce an auxiliary public key pk in and a corresponding encoding.
Setup (1 λ , 1 , d max ) . For each of the input wires, generate two public/secret key pairs. Also, generate an additional public/secret key pair
(pk out , sk out ) ← Keygen(pp), (pk in , sk in ) ← Keygen(pp).
Output mpk := pk 1,0 pk 2,0 . . . pk ,0 pk in pk 1,1 pk 2,1 . . . pk ,1 pk out msk := sk 1,0 sk 2,0 . . . sk ,0 sk in sk 1,1 sk 2,1 . . . sk ,1 sk out .
Enc (mpk, ind, m) . For ind ∈ {0, 1} , choose a uniformly random s $ ← S and encode it under the public keys specified by the following index bits.
Encode s under the input public key. ψ in ← Encode(pk in , s).
Encrypt the message m τ ← E(Encode(pk out , s), m).
Output the ciphertext ct ind := ( ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . , ψ , ψ in , τ ).
KeyGen(msk, C).
(1) For every non-input wire w = + 1, . . . , |C| of the circuit C, and every b ∈ {0, 1}, generate public/secret key pairs. (pk w,b , sk w,b ) ← Keygen(pp).
(2) For the gate g = (u, v, w) with output wire w, compute the four recoding keys rk w b,c (for b, c ∈ {0, 1}).
rk w b,c ← ReKeyGen pk u,b , pk v,c , sk u,b , pk w,g w (b,c) . (3) Also, compute the following recoding key.
rk out ← ReKeyGen pk |C|,1 , pk in , sk |C|,1 , pk out .
Output the evaluation key which is a collection of 4(|C| − ) recoding keys.
ek C := rk w b,c : w ∈ [ + 1, |C| ], b, c ∈ {0, 1} . Output the decryption key dk := rk out . Eval(ek C , ct ind ). We tacitly assume that ct ind contains the index ind. For w = + 1, . . . , |C|, let g = (u, v, w) denote the gate with output wire w. Suppose wires u and v carry the values b * and c * so that wire w carries the value d * := g w (b * , c * ). Compute ψ w,d * ← Recode rk w b * ,c * , ψ u,b * , ψ v,c * . If C(ind) = 1, then we would have computed ψ |C|,1 . Output ct ind := (ψ |C|,1 , ψ in , τ ).
If C(ind) = 0, output ⊥. Dec(dk, ct ind ). Apply the transformation ψ out ← Recode rk out , ψ in , ψ |C|,1 . and output the message m ← D( ψ out , τ ).
Security. We informally state how to modify the simulator in the proof of security in Section 6.4. The simulator gets {pk i , ψ i } i∈[ +2] from the "outside." It assigns pk 1 , . . . , pk as the public keys specified by the bits of ind and pk in := pk +1 , pk out := pk +2 . It is easy to see how to simulate the ciphertext: all the input encodings become a part of it, as well as an encryption of the message using ψ out := ψ +2 . Now, the evaluation key ek is simulated by applying the TOR simulator.
-For query C such that C(ind) = 0, the simulator can choose (pk |C|,1 , sk |C|,1 ) by itself (the public key pk |C|,0 is "fixed" by the TOR simulator). Hence, the decryption key dk can be computed using sk |C|,1 . -On the other hand, for query C such that C(ind) = 1, the adversary is not allowed to obtain the decryption key dk, hence there is not need to simulate it.
B. EXTENDING SECRET KEYS
Consider the following problem: a users holds two (or more) secret keys sk C 1 and sk C 2 . C 1 allows decrypting all ciphertexts addressed to human resources department and C 2 allows to decrypt ciphertexts addressed to share holders. The user wishes to create (and delegate) another secret key sk C * that allows to decrypt ciphertexts addressed to human resources and share holders. The question that we study is whether it is possible to allow the user to compute sk C * without calling the authority holding the master secret key msk. More formally, given {sk C i } i∈ [q] , we require an additional algorithm Extend({sk C i } i∈ [q] , C * ) that returns a secret key sk C * for any circuit C * that is a black-box monotone composition of C i 's. The correctness properties are that of the standard ABE in addition to that sk C * can be used to decrypt ciphertexts ct ind if C * (ind) = 1. The security properties also remain similar to standard ABE: no adversary should be able to learn anything from the ciphertext ct ind about the message m given many secret keys sk C for queries C such that C(ind) = 0, where secret key sk C may be generated via KeyGen or Extend algorithms. Note that only monotone compositions are realizable, since otherwise, a user holding a secret keys sk C , where C(ind) = 0, could come up with a secret key for C and hence break the security game.
To suppose monotone extensions, it is enough to show how to obtain (1) sk C 1 AND C 2 given sk C 1 , sk C 2 , and (2) sk C 1 OR C 2 given sk C 1 , sk C 2 . We start from the construction presented in Section 1 and explain how to modify it.
-First, instead of fixing pk |C i |,1 = pk out in this construction, we sample (pk |C i |,1 , sk |C i |,1 ) ← Keygen(pp) for every query C i . In the secret key sk C i , in additional to all recoding keys for the internal gates, we publish rk aux ← ReKeyGen pk |C i |,1 , pk |C i |,1 , sk |C i |,1 , pk out and also include the secret key sk |C i |,1 . Clearly, this does not affect the correctness, because given an encoding under pk |C i |,1 , the user can compute the encoding under pk out and record the message if C i (ind) = 1. Moreover, this does not affect the security since our simulation proceeds by sampling (pk |C i |,1 , sk |C i |,1 ) honestly using Keygen algorithm and the fact that the adversary is restricted to queries C i such that C i (ind) = 0. -Now, suppose the user holds sk C 1 and sk C 2 , let C * = C 1 AND C 2 (binary OR-gate is handled analogously). Then, we define Extend(sk C 1 , sk C 2 , C * = C 1 AND C 2 ) as follows.
Sample keys associated with the active value (i.e., 1) at the output wire of C * .
pk |C * |,1 , sk |C * |,1 ← Keygen(pp).
Also, sample four recoding keys rk C * b,c (for b, c ∈ {0, 1}): pk |C * |,0 , rk C * 0,0 ← SimReKeyGen pk |C 1 |,0 , pk |C 2 |,0 , rk C * 0,1 ← ReKeyGen pk |C 1 |,0 , pk |C 2 |,1 , sk |C 2 |,1 , pk |C * |,0 , rk C * 1,0 ← ReKeyGen pk |C 1 |,1 , pk |C 2 |,0 , sk |C 1 |,1 , pk |C * |,0 , rk C * 1,1 ← ReKeyGen pk |C 1 |,1 , pk |C 2 |,1 , sk |C 1 |,1 , pk out . And an auxiliary recoding key, rk aux ← ReKeyGen pk |C * |,1 , pk |C * |,1 , sk |C * |,1 , pk out .
The secret key sk C * consists of all recoding keys for the internal gates of C 1 and C 1 , recoding keys rk C * b,c for b, c ∈ {0, 1}, rk aux and secret key sk |C * |,1 . It is easy to see that the correctness is easy to satisfy as previously. In particular, given encoding under output public key pk |C * |,1 the user can obtain encoding under pk aux , and therefore recover the message if C * (ind) = 1. Also, the security holds similarly by satisfying the following invariant: for all wires w carrying value b * when evaluating C * (ind), the simulator knows the secret key sk w,1−b * . Hence, it knows the secret key sk |C * |,1 for all C * such that C * (ind) = 0 and can use it to compute rk aux by running. rk aux ← ReKeyGen pk |C * |,1 , pk |C * |,1 , sk |C * |,1 , pk out .
The remaining internal recoding keys (and the ciphertext) are sampled by the simulator identically as in the security proof in Section 6.3.
